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THE SMALLING OF AMERICA?:
GROWTH MANAGEMENT STATUTES AND
THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
JUSTIN SHOEMAKE
When we start talking about quality of life, they start talking about
cheap underwear. And I keep saying, “You cannot buy small-town
quality of life at a Wal-Mart; they don’t sell it.”1
INTRODUCTION
In the northwestern corner of the state of Vermont, nestled be-
tween the shores of Lake Champlain and the slopes of the Green
Mountains, sits the town of St. Albans, recently rated “the 40th Best
Small Community in the United States.”2 The town takes pride in its
identity, boasting “picturesque scenery, unique shopping, fine dining,
and a wealth of recreational options . . . all wrapped in unspoiled
small town charm.”3 Like the rest of Vermont, St. Albans has good
reason to boast—the state’s natural beauty and quaint villages com-
bine to attract well over two million visitors per year.4
Yet St. Albans and Vermont are in trouble. The National Trust
for Historic Preservation has placed the entire state at the top of its
list of “America’s Eleven Most Endangered Places.”5 The source of
1. 60 Minutes: Up Against the Wal-Mart; Citizen Grass-Roots Activists Fight Movement of
Wal-Mart Chain into Small-Town Areas (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 3, 1995) (quoting Al
Norman).
2. Mary Garceau & Steve Jennette, Welcome to the City of St. Albans (visited March 20,
1999) <http://www.sover.net/~kstanley/city/index.htm>.
3. St. Albans Area Chamber of Commerce (last modified Dec. 12, 1998)
<http://www.stalbanschamber.com/index.htm> (ellipsis in original).
4. See Scott Baldauf, The Call of Vermont’s Vivid Autumn Colors, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 16, 1997, at 3.
5. See Jessica E. Jay, Note, The “Malling” of Vermont: Can the “Growth Center” Desig-
nation Save the Traditional Village from Suburban Sprawl?, 21 VT. L. REV. 929, 929 (1997).
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the danger is the pressure for economic growth in the state, because
while growth is generally viewed as a good thing, growth in late-
twentieth-century America almost always also means sprawl, and
sprawl is a very bad thing indeed. Sprawl has been defined as “low-
density development on the edges of cities and towns that is poorly
planned, land-consumptive, automobile-dependent [and] designed
without regard to its surroundings.”6 Sprawl brings, among other
things, strains on infrastructure, pollution, traffic congestion, the de-
cline of city centers, the death of small towns, and the destruction of
the landscape.
In 1970, Vermont became one of the first states to pass a statute
designed to manage growth and control sprawl on a statewide level.7
Local growth-control ordinances have been an ineffective response to
sprawl, which takes place not locally but regionally.8 State regulation,
because it can respond to growth regionally, is a much more effective
way to deal with sprawl.9 But the effectiveness of state measures does
not alter the possibility that these measures may exceed constitu-
tional limitations on state power. This Note examines whether one of
these limitations, the dormant Commerce Clause, was in fact ex-
ceeded in a recent application of the Vermont statute to a proposed
development in St. Albans.
In 1993, Wal-Mart Stores applied for permission to build a new
store in St. Albans.10 The application was opposed by citizens’ groups
interested in halting the giant retailer’s further expansion into Ver-
mont.11 The dispute was finally resolved by the Vermont Supreme
Court in In re Wal*Mart Stores, Inc. (“Wal*Mart Stores”).12 The court
in that case upheld a ruling by the Vermont Environmental Board,
which had denied a development permit to the retailer that would
6. Robert H. Freilich & Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social Costs of Sprawl, 29 URB. LAW. 183,
185 (1997) (quoting Richard Moe, president of the National Trust for Historic Preservation)
(alteration in original).
7. See James H. Wickersham, Note, The Quiet Revolution Continues: The Emerging New
Model for State Growth Management Statutes, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 489, 512-13 (1994).
8. See Marie L. York, Regions: Blind Isolation or Shared Vision?, 47 LAND USE L. &
ZONING DIG. 3, 3 (1995); Wickersham, supra note 7, at 512.
9. See Shelley Ross Saxer, Local Autonomy or Regionalism?: Sharing the Benefits and
Burdens of Suburban Commercial Development, 30 IND. L. REV. 659, 691 (1997) (noting that
state growth control avoids the problems caused by interlocal conflicts).
10. See In re Wal*Mart Stores, Inc., 702 A.2d 397, 400 (Vt. 1997).
11. See id.
12. 702 A.2d 397 (Vt. 1997).
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have allowed it to construct a store in St. Albans.13 Act 250, the state’s
growth-management statute, instructs the Environmental Board,
when deciding whether to approve a proposed development, to con-
sider, among other things, whether the proposed development will
adversely affect the “financial capacity” of the region to accommo-
date growth.14 Wal-Mart argued that the consideration of “financial
capacity” should be limited to the effect the new store would have on
the local government’s ability to provide services.15 The Board, read-
ing the term more broadly, considered the effect the store would
have on retail competition in the surrounding area.16 The Board con-
cluded that a Wal-Mart in St. Albans would have a negative effect on
its competitors in surrounding towns.17 Because this effect would re-
sult in a decline in property values, and, consequently, a decline in
the tax bases of those towns, the Board denied the permit.18 The
Vermont Supreme Court approved the consideration of the effect of
a new Wal-Mart on other retailers and affirmed the Board’s denial of
the development permit.19
Wal*Mart Stores is consistent with other cases involving limita-
tions on development, for courts have historically granted great def-
erence to the efforts of states and localities to manage or control
growth.20 However, the use of the police power approved by the
Vermont Supreme Court is broader in several ways than that upheld
in previous growth-control cases. First, the ground on which the de-
velopment permit was denied could be used to deny a permit for
most, if not all, large commercial developments in Vermont, because
any such development is likely to have a negative effect on competi-
tors in surrounding towns. Second, the denial could be effected
statewide rather than just locally; because Vermont is one of the few
13. See id. at 400.
14. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(a)(9)(A) (1997).
15. See Wal*Mart Stores, 702 A.2d at 401.
16. See id.
17. See Michael A. Schneider, Note, The Vermont Barrier: How Economic Protectionism
Kept Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Out of St. Albans, Vermont, 20 NOVA L. REV. 919, 941-43 (1996).
18. See id. at 945 (noting the acknowledgment by the Environmental Board that the effect
of the development on retail competition was a consideration common to its evaluation of all
the fiscal criteria listed in the Vermont growth management statute).
19. See Wal*Mart Stores, 702 A.2d at 402, 404.
20. See Keith R. Denny, Note, That Old Due Process Magic: Growth Control and the Fed-
eral Constitution, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1245, 1247 (1990).
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states with a growth-management statute,21 the potential effect of the
Environmental Board’s broad reading of the “financial capacity” cri-
terion is much larger than it would be in the normal growth-control
case.22 Third, although Wal-Mart could presumably reapply, the de-
nial of the development permit is otherwise permanent. One reason
courts have been so deferential to growth-control measures in the
past is that such measures often affect only the timing of develop-
ment, not whether the development will occur at all.23 The considera-
tion of market competition under the fiscal criteria of the Vermont
statute, on the other hand, gives the Environmental Board a justifica-
tion to deny a development forever as long as it concludes that the
development will have an adverse effect on existing market partici-
pants in a region.
The Wal*Mart Stores decision is a vivid example of the deference
with which courts view the power of states to regulate land use. But
by allowing an explicit limitation on market competition that could
easily be employed to keep large retailers out of Vermont, the deci-
sion implicates a provision which has been an effective limit on state
power but which has been invoked only rarely in the land-use con-
text: the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution which, in its
“dormant” aspect, is supposed to ensure “free access to every market
in the Nation.”24
21. See Wickersham, supra note 7, at 489 (noting that in 1994 only nine states had at-
tempted to assert control over land development).
22. Note, however, that any possible violation of the dormant Commerce Clause is not
affected by this factor; local measures and state measures are evaluated in the same manner
under the dormant Commerce Clause. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511
U.S. 383, 391 (1994); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 n.4 (1951).
23. See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291, 304-05 (N.Y. 1972) (upholding a
growth control ordinance and concluding that where a town cannot at present provide the
services that would be required by substantial growth, there is a rational basis for “phased
growth,” but emphasizing that the ordinance at issue would prevent development for a maxi-
mum of 18 years).
24. H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949). The dormant Commerce
Clause was used to challenge a growth control ordinance in Construction Industry Ass’n v. City
of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), and it was suggested by Denny that most growth con-
trol ordinances violate the dormant Commerce Clause, see Denny, supra note 20, at 1279. Wal-
Mart did not invoke the dormant Commerce Clause in its appeal to the Vermont Supreme
Court. The rarity with which the Commerce Clause has been used to challenge growth control
measures may be due in part to the fact that many measures attempt to place limits on in-
creases in population growth, making other constitutional challenges available in a way they
are not when, as here, only commercial growth is excluded. See, e.g., Associated Home Build-
ers v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 475 (Cal. 1976) (involving a challenge, based partly on
the constitutionally protected right to travel, to an ordinance prohibiting the issuance of resi-
dential building permits). Parties wishing to challenge growth control ordinances in the past
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This Note considers whether a dormant Commerce Clause chal-
lenge to the broad interpretation of Act 250’s fiscal criteria would
succeed. Part I examines the history and form of growth-control
measures, first at the local and then at the state level. Act 250 and the
traditional deference of courts to growth-control measures are also
examined. Part II summarizes the history of the St. Albans dispute
and discusses the decision of the Vermont Supreme Court in In re
Wal*Mart Stores. Part III briefly outlines present dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine, the many questions surrounding the doctrine’s
meaning, and how the doctrine is to be applied. Finally, Part IV ap-
plies the doctrine to the Vermont Supreme Court’s interpretation of
Act 250’s fiscal criteria. The Note concludes that while a dormant
Commerce Clause challenge to a growth-management statute could
succeed in other contexts, such a challenge would be highly unlikely
to succeed against the Vermont growth-management statute’s fiscal
criteria.
I. GROWTH CONTROL MEASURES AT THE STATE AND LOCAL
LEVELS
A. Growth Control at the Local Levels
Growth control measures are land-use regulations employed by
state and local governments in an attempt to control the rate of eco-
nomic and population growth within a jurisdiction.25 The first growth-
control measures began to appear during the second quarter of the
twentieth century, and they have become much more common over
the last three decades.26 Local growth-control ordinances are now
found in a number of different forms all over the country.27 They are
                                                                                                                                     
(ordinances that rarely, if ever, burdened commerce in the way the Vermont measure poten-
tially does) may also have concluded that Commerce Clause challenges were unlikely to suc-
ceed. This conclusion would have been reinforced by the dismissive language used by the court
in Petaluma. See Petaluma, 522 F.2d at 909 (“It is well settled that a state regulation validly
based on the police power does not impermissibly burden interstate commerce where the
regulation neither discriminates against interstate commerce nor operates to disrupt its re-
quired uniformity.”).
25. See Katherine E. Stone & Philip A. Seymour, Regulating the Timing of Development:
Takings Clause and Substantive Due Process Challenges to Growth Control Regulations, 24
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1205, 1207 (1991).
26. See ERIC DAMIAN KELLY, MANAGING COMMUNITY GROWTH: POLICIES, TECH-
NIQUES, AND IMPACTS 7 (1993).
27. See Denny, supra note 20, at 1245 (noting that over 200 growth control ordinances
were on the ballot in California during the 1980s and that 70% of the ordinances proposed in a
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not in place everywhere, however, and it may be useful at the outset
to distinguish between growth control and zoning, which is used al-
most everywhere, in order to emphasize the potential constitutional
problems raised by growth-control measures.28
Local governments, which in the twentieth century have borne
the primary responsibility for the regulation of land use, have exer-
cised this responsibility mainly through the use of zoning.29 Since the
adoption of the first comprehensive zoning ordinance by New York
City in 1916,30 every major American city except Houston has
adopted a zoning ordinance.31 Zoning, as its name implies, is the
separation of different land uses into zones or districts “in which only
compatible uses are allowed and incompatible uses are excluded.”32
Zoning, however, did not originate as a means of controlling or lim-
iting growth; rather, it was used mainly to separate “undesirable”
from “desirable” uses, with “desirable” normally referring to single-
family residential dwellings.33 Zoning ordinances, then, limit where,
                                                                                                                                     
recent two-and-a-half-year period passed); Susan M. Wachter & Man Cho, Interjurisdictional
Price Effects of Land Use Controls, 40 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 49, 49 (1991) (noting
an increase in the number of land-use regulations adopted by local governments).
28. Cf. Denny, supra note 20, at 1280 (concluding that most growth control ordinances
offend a number of federal constitutional provisions).
29. See Wickersham, supra note 7, at 492.
30. See Charles M. Haar, The Twilight of Land-Use Controls: A Paradigm Shift?, 30 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1011, 1011 (1996).
31. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 1.01, at 1 (3d ed. 1993). The legiti-
macy of zoning as a local government’s exercise of the police power was upheld by the Su-
preme Court in the famous case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397
(1926), and while zoning ordinances as applied to particular property owners have been suc-
cessfully challenged in the years since, the holding in Euclid, recognizing the authority of local
governments to zone, is largely unquestioned. The most famous example of such a challenge is
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), where the Court reversed the denial of an
injunction to stop enforcement of a zoning decision that had placed the plaintiff’s property in a
residential zone. See id. at 189; see also Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, 124 F.3d
597, 603 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Euclid and declaring that “[l]and use planning and the adoption
of land use restrictions constitute some of the most important functions performed by local
government”).
32. MANDELKER, supra note 31, § 4.16, at 113-14.
33. See ALEXANDRA D. DAWSON, LAND-USE PLANNING AND THE LAW 37 (1982). In-
deed, it was the protection of single-family residences and not the control of growth which pro-
vided the chief justification for the Supreme Court’s approval of the zoning power in Euclid.
Justice Sutherland, in his majority opinion in that case, wrote:
These reports . . . concur in the view that the segregation of residential, business, and
industrial buildings will make it easier to provide fire apparatus suitable for the
character and intensity of the development in each section; that it will increase the
safety and security of home life; greatly tend to prevent street accidents, especially to
children, by reducing the traffic and resulting confusion in residential sections;
decrease noise and other conditions which produce or intensify nervous disorders;
preserve a more favorable environment in which to rear children, etc. With
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within a locality, a particular type of growth may take place; they do
not necessarily limit the amount of growth or development within a
particular locality at all.34
Growth control ordinances, on the other hand, place explicit
limits on the overall rate of development within a locality. Generally,
growth-control ordinances are enacted with at least one of two pur-
poses.35 The first is to ensure that development within a jurisdiction
does not proceed so quickly that the local government is unable to
meet the increased demands on it for public services.36 The second is
to delay or prevent unwanted changes in the character of a commu-
nity.37 Thus, while zoning ordinances may in practice exclude par-
ticular entities or persons from a locality, growth-control ordinances,
by setting overall limits on development, are specifically designed to
do so.
This design may take a number of forms. The most important
method of growth control is comprehensive planning.38 Local gov-
ernments are often required by statute to develop a comprehensive
plan and to make all subsequent land-use decisions with reference to,
and in accordance with, that plan.39 A comprehensive plan may at-
tempt to limit development by providing for timed growth or by
placing restrictions on the development of infrastructure.40 Other
                                                                                                                                     
particular reference to apartment houses, it is pointed out that the development
of detached house sections is greatly retarded by the coming of apartment houses,
which has sometimes resulted in destroying the entire section for private house pur-
poses; that in such sections very often the apartment house is a mere parasite . . . .
Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394; see also ROBERT R. WRIGHT & MORTON GITELMAN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LAND USE 779 (4th ed. 1991) (pointing out that while the authority of local
governments to zone is not usually questioned, the protection of single-family dwelling units
and the “strict segregation of uses” endorsed by Euclid are now viewed by many as question-
able land-use policy).
34. A full discussion of zoning is beyond the scope of this Note, but it should be mentioned
that there are limitations on a locality’s ability to use a zoning ordinance to exclude undesirable
uses or people. See MANDELKER, supra note 31, §§ 5.27-.55, at 172-97.
35. See Stone & Seymour, supra note 25, at 1207.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See Stanley D. Abrams, Casenotes and Comments on Local Growth Control Manage-
ment Concepts, C750 ALI-ABA 629, 634 (1992); see also id. at 631 (listing the various types of
growth control measures employed by local governments).
39. See id. at 634.
40. See id. “Timed growth” provisions do not allow growth until adequate infrastructure
exists to support new development. See Jane E. Schukoske, Housing Linkage: Regulating De-
velopment Impact on Housing Costs, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1024 n.76 (1991). Note the basic
similarity between this type of measure and an Adequate Public Facilities Ordinance. See infra
notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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methods of growth control include: forcing developers to pay some of
the public costs created by their particular projects; using transferable
development rights; setting urban growth boundaries; and placing a
moratorium on new development.41 Growth control schemes may in-
corporate a number of these and other techniques.42
The local growth-control tool most similar to the Vermont crite-
ria at issue in Wal*Mart Stores has been dubbed the Adequate Public
Facilities Ordinance, or APFO.43 Unlike a moratorium, an APFO
does not flatly prohibit development. Instead, it requires the ap-
proval of all new development by a local governmental body, which
must determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the local govern-
ment has the capacity, or will soon have the capacity, to provide the
services that will be required by the development for which a permit
is sought.44
There are relatively few reported cases addressing challenges to
growth-control ordinances, and most involve objections to limitations
on residential rather than commercial development.45 In the cases
that have been decided, courts have shown a high degree of defer-
ence to local attempts to control growth.46 The classic case is Golden
v. Planning Board,47 in which the New York Court of Appeals upheld
against constitutional attack a version of an Adequate Public Facili-
ties Ordinance which had the potential to delay some residential de-
velopment for as long as eighteen years.48 The court, which cautioned
that it would “not countenance . . . under any guise . . . community ef-
41. A “transferable development right” is the right to sever the development “right” to a
piece of real property located in a restricted growth area and to transfer this right to a site in a
transfer area. Development on the second site is allowed despite the fact that this development
might otherwise violate zoning or other restrictions. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & WILLIAM
KRIER, PROPERTY 1213 (3d ed. 1998). An urban growth boundary marks the line between
growth areas, where development is encouraged, and “slow growth” or “conservation” areas,
where it is not. Wickersham, supra note 7, at 539. Local governments may place moratoria on
development in order to give themselves time to provide the public services necessitated by
further growth, but a state’s courts will closely examine a locality’s motives for taking this type
of action. See Abrams, supra note 38, at 641, 644 (noting that New York courts require that a
local government show that a moratorium is a “dire necessity”).
42. See Amy C. Brandt, Comment, Sedona’s Sustainable Growth Ordinance: Testing the
Parameters of Dolan v. City of Tigard, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1297, 1301 (1996).
43. See Abrams, supra note 38, at 635.
44. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(a)(9)(A) (1997); Abrams, supra note 38, at 635.
45. See Stone & Seymour, supra note 25, at 1208-09.
46. See id. at 1209.
47. 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972).
48. See id. at 304-05.
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forts at immunization or exclusion,”49 nevertheless upheld the meas-
ure, finding that the purpose pursued by the ordinance was
“undisputably laudatory”50 and that the restrictions on land, while
they might last “as long as a full generation,”51 were not permanent.52
Those challenging the ordinance argued that the community’s real
purpose was to avoid its responsibility for absorbing growth, but the
court disagreed and declared that the purpose of the measure was to
ensure “a balanced cohesive community dedicated to the efficient
utilization of land.”53 The court declined to remark on the possibility
that when the pressure for growth is strong enough, the latter goal
may be impossible to accomplish without simultaneously pursuing
the former one.
Construction Industry Ass’n v. City of Petaluma54 is another
leading case involving a challenge to a growth-control measure. The
measure at issue in Petaluma limited the construction of new housing
units in developments of five or more units to a total of 500 per
year.55 The plaintiffs contended that the measure, which was only ef-
fective for a five-year period, violated their rights to substantive due
process because it was arbitrary and unreasonable.56 They also argued
that the purpose of the measure was to exclude people who otherwise
would have chosen to move to Petaluma.57 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals disagreed, holding that the plan was not a violation of sub-
stantive due process and declaring that the ordinance was a lawful
exercise of the zoning power that had been delegated to the local
government by the state.58 The court went on to say that if the ordi-
49. Id. at 302.
50. Id. at 296.
51. Id. at 303.
52. See id. at 304.
53. Id. at 301-02.
54. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975).
55. See id. at 901.
56. See id. at 900, 905.
57. See id. at 902, 905-06.
58. See id. at 908-09. The court in Petaluma apparently equated the ordinance at issue with
a zoning ordinance. See id. at 909. It is not immediately evident, however, that the power dele-
gated to localities in zoning enabling statutes necessarily includes the power to enact growth
control legislation. The U.S. Supreme Court has also been careless in distinguishing between
zoning and growth control, or has viewed the distinction as unimportant. For example, in his
dissent in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), Justice Marshall wrote, “local
zoning authorities may properly act in furtherance of the objectives asserted to be served by
the ordinance at issue here: restricting uncontrolled growth, solving traffic problems, keeping
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nance did not serve regional interests, it was up to the state legisla-
ture and not the court to intervene.59 Courts, it said, are not “super
zoning board[s] and should not be called on to mark the point at
which legitimate local interests in promoting the welfare of the com-
munity are outweighed by legitimate regional interests.”60
The court in Petaluma also dismissed the plaintiffs’ Commerce
Clause claim. The court first declared that a state or local measure
enacted in pursuit of a legitimate public purpose cannot violate the
Commerce Clause when it does not discriminate against interstate
commerce or prevent a necessary uniformity of regulation across
state lines; it then cursorily concluded that the Petaluma ordinance
did neither.61 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case, and a
clash between growth control and the Commerce Clause was put off
until another day.62
B. Growth Control at the State Level
Local attempts to control growth may be ineffective for a num-
ber of reasons, the most obvious of which is growth control’s depend-
ence on the political process.63 There are often strong incentives for
small towns to accept and even invite development, incentives which
can make the passage or effective implementation of a growth-
control measure difficult.64 A town may receive a substantial financial
benefit from a large commercial development in the form of jobs and
taxes.65 Meanwhile, the costs of development, including population
increase and traffic congestion, are typically spread across an entire
region.66 Political support for a development, then, will often be con-
centrated in the locality where the development is to take place. Fi-
nally, even if a locality can successfully control development within
its borders, development may simply move to other localities within
                                                                                                                                     
rental costs at a reasonable level, and making the community attractive to families.” Id. at 13
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
59. See Petaluma, 522 F.2d at 908.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 909.
62. See Construction Indus. Ass’n v. City of Petaluma, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
63. See Scott Hadly, Threat of Suits May Kill Plan to Limit Homes, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5,
1994, at B5 (quoting William Fulton, an urban planner, as saying that growth control “gives
cities the feeling that they control the ball, but the outcome is not going to be that much differ-
ent whether or not you have a cap”).
64. See Wickersham, supra note 7, at 503.
65. See id.
66. See id.
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the same region, perhaps shifting, but not reducing, overall costs and
effects.67
Suspicion regarding state control over land-use regulation can
make it difficult to secure passage of a statewide growth-control
measure,68 but some states, recognizing the shortcomings of growth
control (or lack of control) at the local level, have nevertheless suc-
ceeded in enacting some form of growth-management scheme.69 As
early as 1955, California enacted legislation requiring local govern-
ments to develop plans which included certain prescribed elements.70
Hawaii took most control of the development process away from its
local governments in 1961.71 What was hailed as a “quiet revolution,”
in which states would increasingly remove responsibility for land-use
regulation from local governments, began later that decade.72 In 1964,
the American Law Institute began work on the Model Land Devel-
opment Code, a model land-use statute that, unlike the Standard
Zoning Enabling Act (a model zoning law), included an active role
for state governments.73 A few states, including Vermont, passed
growth-management statutes in the early 1970s,74 and while the “quiet
revolution” has yet to occur,75 a number of other states (although not
a majority) have passed growth-management statutes in the last
twenty-five years.76
Despite being commonly referred to as “growth management”
statutes, these statutes are modeled on local growth-control meas-
67. See id. at 510.
68. See J. BARRY CULLINGWORTH, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF PLANNING: AMERICAN
LAND USE PLANNING IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 138 (1993) (noting that suspicion of
state control of land use kept Vermont’s growth management statute from being implemented
effectively).
69. See Wickersham, supra note 7, at 512 (noting that growth management statutes were
passed in Vermont, Florida, and Oregon to “address the persistent problems raised by Euclid-
ean zoning and local control of land use”).
70. See Douglas R. Porter, State Growth Management: The Intergovernmental Experiment,
13 PACE L. REV. 481, 482 n.2 (1993).
71. See id.
72. See CULLINGWORTH, supra note 68, at 133 (quoting FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID
CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL 1 (1972)).
73. See Thomas R. McKeon, Comment, State Regulation of Subdivisions: Defining the
Boundary Between State and Local Land Use Jurisdiction in Vermont, Maine, and Florida, 19
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 385, 389 (1991).
74. See Wickersham, supra note 7, at 512.
75. See CULLINGWORTH, supra note 68, at 133.
76. These states include Oregon, Florida, Rhode Island, Maine, New Jersey, Georgia,
Washington, and Maryland. See Porter, supra note 70, at 481.
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ures,77 and, like their local counterparts, growth-management statutes
take widely varying forms.78 In addition to the elements that may be
found in local measures,79 growth-management statutes may mandate:
the creation of a statewide plan for development; consistency be-
tween state and local plans; and state or regional approval of large
developments.80
Even though they may potentially place much greater burdens
on private interests than local measures, state attempts to control and
manage growth are likely to receive an even greater degree of defer-
ence from courts than local measures. In the Golden case, discussed
above, both the majority and the dissenters, who would have invali-
dated the ordinance, spoke favorably of state and regional planning.81
The majority opinion noted that “[s]tate-wide or regional control of
planning would insure that interests broader than that of the munici-
pality underlie various land-use policies,”82 while the dissent sug-
gested that, at the least, “a regional planning mechanism should be
devised to create a pluralist suburbia in which each class could find its
proper place.”83 The Golden case was concerned with whether that
town could exclude people rather than businesses, but the favorable
language used by the court to describe state land-use planning sug-
gests that courts are likely to give states a wide berth when they use
their police power to manage either residential or commercial
growth.
C. Growth Control in Vermont
The “premier environmental and land use law” in Vermont is
Act 250,84 passed by the Vermont legislature in 1970.85 The stated
77. See Note, State-Sponsored Growth Management as a Remedy for Exclusionary Zoning,
108 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1137 (1995).
78. See Porter, supra note 70, at 483.
79. See supra notes 29-44 and accompanying text.
80. See generally Porter, supra note 70, at 483-500 (discussing growth management
schemes and their various elements).
81. See Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291, 300 (N.Y. 1972); id. at 310 (Breitel, J.,
dissenting).
82. Id. at 300.
83. Id. at 310 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
84. Richard O. Brooks, Legal Realism, Norman Williams, and Vermont’s Act 250, 20 VT.
L. REV. 699, 699 (1996).
85. See An Act to Create an Environmental Board and District Environmental Commis-
sions (Act 250), 1969 Vt. Acts & Resolves 250 (codified as amended at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 6001-6108 (1997 & Supp. 1998)).
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purpose of Act 250 is to “protect and conserve the lands and the en-
vironment of the State and to ensure that these lands and environ-
ment are devoted to uses which are not detrimental to the public wel-
fare and interests.”86 Act 250, which strongly influenced those
developing the Model Land Development Code,87 has two major fea-
tures.88 The first is the Act’s provision for three statewide plans for
development.89 While the first two plans, an interim land-capability
plan and a capability and development plan, were adopted, the third
plan, a comprehensive land-use plan, has never been approved.90 The
second major feature, which has been put into effect, is the require-
ment that all large developments be approved by “district environ-
mental commissions.”91
Generally, Act 250 requires a development permit for industrial
or commercial developments of over ten acres, housing projects of
ten or more units where each unit is located on fewer than ten acres,
and developments above an elevation of 2,500 feet.92 Act 250 sets out
a long list of criteria to guide the district commissions in making their
permit determinations.93 Some of these criteria are environmental,94
while others are fiscal, including, for example, whether the develop-
ment would unreasonably burden the ability of a locality to provide
educational services.95 Another fiscal criterion requires the commis-
sions to evaluate the “impact” of the proposed development:
86. Id. § 1, 1969 Vt. Acts & Resolves 237-38.
87. See Wickersham, supra note 7, at 512.
88. See CULLINGWORTH, supra note 68, at 138 (describing the unique features of Act 250,
including the development permit system and the preparation of three statewide plans).
89. See Act 250, §§ 18, 19, 20, 1969 Vt. Acts & Resolves 245-46 (providing for, respec-
tively, an interim land capability plan, a capability and development plan, and a land-use plan).
Section 18 was codified at § 6041 of the Vermont state code and then omitted as obsolete after
the provisions were executed. Section 19 is codified as amended at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §
6042 (1997). Section 20 was codified at § 6043 of the state code and was repealed in 1983.
90. See CULLINGWORTH, supra note 68, at 138 (stating that the final land-use plan “never
emerged”).
91. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6026 (1997).
92. See KELLY, supra note 26, at 108-09.
93. See Jay, supra note 5, at 949 & n.139.
94. The commissions must consider whether the development will: result in undue air or
water pollution; have access to a sufficient water supply but not unreasonably burden that sup-
ply; cause excessive erosion of the land or unreasonable traffic congestion; or have an unrea-
sonably adverse effect on the natural beauty or historic sites of an area. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 6086(a) (1997). The commissions also must consider whether a development conforms
with the statewide capability and development plan (and, when adopted, the final land-use
plan), as well as any existing local or regional plan. See id.
95. See id. § 6086(a)(6).
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[T]he district commission or the board shall take into consideration
the growth in population experienced by the town and region in
question and whether or not the proposed development would sig-
nificantly affect their existing and potential financial capacity to rea-
sonably accommodate both the total growth and the rate of growth
otherwise expected for the town and region and the total growth and
rate of growth which would result from the development if ap-
proved.96
The commission must find that all of the listed criteria have been
satisfied before a project can be approved.97 Appeals from the deci-
sions of the district commissions go to the Environmental Board,
which was created by Act 250.98 Appeals from the decisions of the
Environmental Board, in turn, are made to the Vermont Supreme
Court.99
Despite its rather daunting list of requirements, many now view
Act 250 as ineffective at managing growth in Vermont.100 This ineffec-
tiveness is largely due to the fact that the system created by Act 250 is
a “reactive” one, limited to evaluating large developments as they
come up for approval.101 The lack of a statewide plan for development
means that growth is “managed,” if at all, in a piecemeal fashion.102
Large-scale development cannot be directed or channeled into par-
ticular areas; it can only be approved or rejected when the district en-
vironmental commissions make their permit decisions.103 In addition,
it is often possible to structure development so that the ten-acre
96. Id. § 6086(a)(9)(A).
97. See id. § 6086(d) (stating that the “board shall not approve” a project “unless it satis-
fies the appropriate requirements of section (a)”).
98. See id. § 6089.
99. See id.
100. See CULLINGWORTH, supra note 68, at 139 (“In short, as a growth management sys-
tem, a lot remains to be desired.”); Jay, supra note 5, at 950 (“Unfortunately, the permit system
under Act 250 has not prevented the encroachment of larger scale development in the form of
‘box retailers’ into Vermont.” (citation omitted)). But see Wickersham, supra note 7, at 518
n.183 (pointing out that while only 2.5% of projects were denied approval from 1970 to 1979,
almost all approved projects were subject to modifying conditions).
101. See CULLINGWORTH, supra note 68, at 139.
102. See Jay, supra note 5, at 950-51.
103. See CULLINGWORTH, supra note 68, at 139 (noting that the Act 250 system only
“evaluates planning proposals submitted for approval” rather than directing “growth to areas
which are considered by planners to be suitable for growth”); Jay, supra note 5, at 950
(discussing Act 250’s “inability to address cumulative impacts, such as strip development and
other elements of sprawl”).
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threshold is never crossed and review under Act 250 is not trig-
gered.104
It is, however, impossible for some developments to escape re-
view. Citizens are increasingly concerned about the effects of growth,
and development permits, when they are required, will probably only
become more difficult to obtain.105 The criteria used by the district
commissions to make permit decisions rely heavily on words like
“unreasonably” and “undue” and leave a lot of room for interpreta-
tion.106 Moreover, the large number of criteria give the commissions a
number of bases on which to deny a development permit.107 The
commissioners’ large degree of discretion creates the possibility that
Act 250 may be used in a manner that encroaches on constitutional
protections like the dormant Commerce Clause.
II. WAL*MART STORES AND THE CONSIDERATION OF MARKET
COMPETITION
In 1993, Wal-Mart selected a forty-four-acre tract about two
miles from downtown St. Albans as the site for a new store.108 Be-
cause the site was larger than ten acres, Wal-Mart was required to ob-
tain a permit for the development,109 and in September 1993 the com-
pany filed its permit application.110 On December 21, 1993, despite
opposition from the Franklin/Grand Isle County Citizens for Down-
town Preservation (Citizens) and the Vermont Natural Resources
Council (VNRC), Wal-Mart was granted a permit by the District Six
Environmental Commission.111
Citizens and VNRC had been denied party status by the Com-
mission with respect to a number of the Act 250 criteria and were
thus unable to contest the permit application under those criteria be-
104. See CULLINGWORTH, supra note 68, at 139 (stating that land sales and development
may be purposely designed to escape review of the provisions aimed at large-scale develop-
ments).
105. The district environmental commissions as well as the Environmental Board are made
up of lay citizens. See id. at 138.
106. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(a) (1997) (stating that permissible develop-
ment “[w]ill not place an unreasonable burden on the ability of the local governments to pro-
vide municipal or governmental services”).
107. See id. (listing 10 criteria, many with subcriteria, that must be satisfied before a permit
may be issued).
108. See Schneider, supra note 17, at 929-30.
109. See id. at 930.
110. See In re Wal*Mart Stores, Inc., 702 A.2d 397, 400 (Vt. 1997).
111. See Schneider, supra note 17, at 930-31.
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fore the Commission.112 When the two groups appealed the decision
of the Commission to the Environmental Board, however, the Board
granted them party status with respect to most of these criteria;113 the
procedural effect of this decision was that the Environmental Board
then conducted a de novo review of the development application un-
der many of these Act 250 criteria.114
The Board found that the proposed development complied with
all of Act 250’s environmental criteria.115 The Board also found, how-
ever, that the proposed development did not satisfy the following fis-
cal criteria: the development’s burden to the town’s ability to provide
educational (Criterion 6) and other governmental (Criterion 7) serv-
ices; the development’s impact on the ability of the town and region
to accommodate growth (Criterion 9(A)); and the costs of scattered
development in relation to its benefits (Criterion 9(H)).116
The Board first considered the effect that the Wal-Mart would
have on market competition under Criterion 9(A), the “impact of
growth” criterion.117 The Board found that the development would
cause only a minor direct population increase118 but voiced a concern
that the Wal-Mart would attract significant secondary growth to St.
Albans and noted that Wal-Mart had failed to present evidence de-
tailing the costs and benefits of such growth.119 Because of this failure,
the Board judged that Wal-Mart had not sustained its burden of
proof with respect to Criterion 9(A) and denied the permit applica-
tion on that basis.120
Although it was unnecessary, the Board went on to consider the
application under the other appealed criteria.121 Because the pro-
posed Wal-Mart was not physically contiguous to an existing settle-
ment, the criterion addressing the costs of scattered development ap-
112. See id. at 930.
113. See id. at 930-31 (noting that both groups were denied party status on historical sites
criterion but were granted party status for the other criteria including waste disposal, wetlands,
impact of growth, public investments and facilities, and conformity with local plan).
114. See id. at 931 & n.114.
115. See id. at 932.
116. See id. at 937; see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(a) (1997) (listing the criteria nec-
essary before a permit can be issued).
117. See Schneider, supra note 17, at 938.
118. See id. at 939 (discussing the Board’s findings that all but five employees would be
hired from the local labor market and those five employees would bring six children).
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 940-45.
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plied to it.122 Consideration of this criterion includes an analysis of
public benefits and costs.123 The Board concluded that the figures
submitted by Citizens and VNRC were more credible and thus used
those numbers in its analysis.124 These figures showed an annual pub-
lic benefit from the development of $109,000 and an annual public
cost of $315,000, $129,000 of which was due to the loss in tax revenue
resulting from the increased competition brought by the Wal-Mart.125
Working with these numbers, the Board could hardly do anything but
deny the permit application.126 Wal-Mart failed to present any calcu-
lations concerning the public benefits of secondary growth that would
occur as a result of the new store.127 Had it done so, Wal-Mart might
have been able to counter the numbers offered by Citizens or VNRC
and might have been able to win approval on this point.128
The Board also denied the application under the criteria dealing
with the development’s impact on schools and local government
services.129 As with the other criteria, Wal-Mart’s failure to present
estimates regarding secondary growth prevented the Board from im-
posing mitigating conditions that might have allowed the develop-
ment.130
One factor common to the Board’s decision with respect to each
of these criteria was the “competitive effect of [the] project on exist-
ing businesses.”131 Justifying its consideration of this factor, the Board
stated:
The issue is protection of the tax base. . . . [T]he General Assembly
intended that the Board and district commissions consider that part
of the economic impact of a development is any reduction in the tax
base caused by a proposed development. For example, [one crite-
122. See id. at 940.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 941 & nn.167-69 (noting that the Board questioned the credibility of testi-
mony from RKG Associates, given at the hearing on behalf of Wal-Mart, because of
“significant differences” in projections, made by RKG, based on conflicting assumptions re-
garding three criteria: annual average sales; recapture of residents’ purchases currently made
out of town; and percentage of total sales to Canadian citizens).
125. See id. at 941-42.
126. See id. at 942-43.
127. See id. at 941.
128. See id. at 942-43.
129. See id. at 943-44.
130. See id. at 943.
131. Id. at 937 (quoting Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at 27, In re
Wal*Mart Stores, Inc. (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994) (No. 6F0471-EB)).
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rion] . . . speak[s] in terms of the “ability” of a local government to
provide services, which can only be determined by reference to the
available tax base. Similarly, Criterion 9(A) [addressing the impact
of growth] speaks of the impact of a project on a town’s “financial
capacity.” Also, Criterion 9(H) [addressing the costs of scattered de-
velopment] refers to a project’s “indirect” costs.132
The Board acknowledged that the effect of the Wal-Mart on
market competition, and the consequences to the tax base, underlay
its decisions under each of the criteria.133 It was careful to note, how-
ever, that its decision had nothing to do with the protection of local
businesses:
[W]e wish to make clear that our concern under Act 250’s criteria is
exclusively with the economic impact of a proposed development on
public, not private entities. A proposed development may have a di-
rect and substantial adverse economic impact on one or more exist-
ing businesses; however, that impact on competing private entities is
irrelevant to our analysis under Act 250 unless it can also be shown
that there is a resultant material adverse economic impact on the
ability or capacity of a municipality or other governmental entity to
provide public services.134
Based on these findings, the Board issued an order voiding Wal-
Mart’s land-use permit on December 23, 1994.135
Wal-Mart appealed the ruling of the Environmental Board to
the Vermont Supreme Court.136 The court, which generally gives the
Board’s interpretations of Act 250 a presumption of validity,137 up-
held the decision of the Board in all respects, including the denial of
the permit under the different fiscal criteria.138 After rejecting Wal-
Mart’s contention that the term “growth” in Criterion 9(A), which
addresses the “‘financial capacity’ of the town and region to accom-
modate growth,”139 encompassed only population increase and did not
132. Id. at 938 (quoting Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at 27, In re
Wal*Mart Stores, Inc. (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994) (No. 6F0471-EB))
133. See id. at 945.
134. Id. at 945 (quoting Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at 29, In re
Wal*Mart Stores, Inc. (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Dec. 23, 1994) (No. 6F0471-EB)).
135. See id. at 930.
136. See In re Wal*Mart Stores, Inc., 702 A.2d 397, 400 (Vt. 1997).
137. See McKeon, supra note 73, at 394.
138. See Wal*Mart Stores, 702 A.2d at 402-03.
139. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(a)(9)(A) (1997).
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include economic growth,140 the court concluded that the considera-
tion of market competition was warranted by the “plain language” of
the Criterion.141 The court went on to say that, even in the absence of
this language, the consideration of market competition would have
been allowable because the Criterion requires the district environ-
mental commissions and the Board to consider the increased costs of
education, highway maintenance, fire protection, and other services
that will result from the development.142 Because a municipality’s
ability to provide these services depends on its tax base, said the
court, a development’s impact on the tax base through the develop-
ment’s effect on market competition is a relevant factor.143 Finally,
the court found that the consideration of market competition was
also allowable under Criteria 6 and 7, which concern the develop-
ment’s burden on the town’s ability to provide educational and other
governmental services, respectively. 144
Clearly, the denial of a permit to Wal-Mart in this case was
largely the retailer’s own fault. Its apparent failure to provide credi-
ble or complete data concerning the effect that the construction of a
store would have on St. Albans and the surrounding area left the En-
vironmental Board with the unfavorable data provided by Citizens
and VNRC. Wal-Mart, by more effectively countering these data,
could have given the Board the option of approving the permit with
mitigating conditions. It is therefore difficult to argue that one should
have much sympathy for the retailer in this case. Nevertheless,
Wal*Mart Stores effectively demonstrates how broadly courts have
construed the police power in the land-use context. If an adverse ef-
fect on nothing other than the tax base of surrounding towns (note
that there were no environmental concerns over the proposed Wal-
Mart) is enough on which to base a permit denial, then commercial
developments of more than ten acres could effectively be prohibited
within Vermont’s borders. This possibility is enhanced by the large
degree of discretion granted to the district environmental commis-
140. See Wal*Mart Stores, 702 A.2d at 404 (concluding “that the Legislature intended the
word ‘growth’ as used in Criterion 9(A), to apply to economic, as well as population growth”).
Wal-Mart argued that the term growth was thus limited under the doctrine of ejusdem generis.
See id. at 403.
141. Id. at 403-04.
142. See id. at 404-05.
143. See id. at 402, 405.
144. See id. at 402. The court did not discuss Criterion 9(H), which compares the costs of
“scattered” development with its benefits. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(a)(9)(H) (1997).
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sions and the Environmental Board. The question, then, is whether
the state has exceeded the limits of its power to manage growth.
Such a limit could come from a variety of constitutional and
nonconstitutional sources. A plaintiff challenging a growth-control
measure could argue, for instance, that a particular measure is an im-
permissible use of the police power because it is not rationally related
to a legitimate public purpose;145 that it violates other laws, including
federal antitrust law;146 or that it violates one of a number of constitu-
tional protections, such as the Privileges and Immunities Clauses,147
the right of interstate travel,148 substantive due process,149 or the Tak-
ings Clause.150 This Note is limited to evaluating whether the consid-
eration of market competition under Act 250’s fiscal criteria, and the
possibility that this consideration could be used to keep all large-scale
retailers out of Vermont, could be challenged successfully under the
dormant Commerce Clause. In the process, it should shed some light
on whether a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a growth-
management statute could ever succeed.
III. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Constitution grants Congress the power to “regulate com-
merce . . . among the several states.”151 The Supreme Court has long
interpreted the Commerce Clause as an implicit limitation on the
power of the states to regulate interstate commerce.152 The Court has
explained this interpretation by saying that the real goals of the
Framers were the preservation of “free access to every market in the
Nation”153 and the assurance that “one state in its dealings with an-
145. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 483 (Cal.
1976) (en banc) (analyzing a land-use restriction ordinance to determine whether “it bears a
reasonable relation to the general welfare”).
146. But see Jonathan Moore Peterson, Note, Taming the Sprawlmart: Using an Antitrust
Arsenal to Further Historic Preservation Goals, 27 URB. LAW. 333, 364-81 (1995) (arguing that
local governments have broad ability to exclude or exact concessions from large retailers, par-
ticularly through the use of zoning, without violating federal antitrust law).
147. See Denny, supra note 20, at 1269.
148. See id. at 1275.
149. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Ass’n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 905 (9th Cir.
1975).
150. See Brandt, supra note 42, at 1298.
151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
152. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 208-09 (1824).
153. H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
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other [will] not place itself in a position of economic isolation.”154 The
Court apparently believes that Congress, because its attention is de-
manded on a large range of matters, cannot be expected to monitor
such protectionism on its own and that the Court, therefore, must act
as a kind of administrative assistant to Congress.155 The Court’s inter-
pretation has never been without controversy, but this “dormant” as-
pect of the Commerce Clause, despite continual disagreement over
its contours, is now a firmly-entrenched feature of constitutional law.
The Court, which originally interpreted the dormant Commerce
Clause as a complete prohibition on state regulation of interstate
commerce,156 soon recognized that, because interstate commerce is
inextricably intertwined with nearly every aspect of life, denying the
states any power to legislate in the area was an extreme position that
could upset the delicate balance of power between the states and the
national government.157 The dormant Commerce Clause now limits
state power only when that power is employed to discriminate against
or excessively burden interstate commerce.158 How this limitation is
enforced depends on whether the measure at issue is an economic
regulation or a tax.159 Because Act 250 is an economic regulation, only
the rules governing this type of measure are examined here.
154. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978) (quoting H.P. Hood &
Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949)).
155. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 401-02 (2d ed. 1988).
156. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 209.
157. See Thompson Willson et al. v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 251
(1829) (“Measures calculated to produce these objects, provided they do not come into colli-
sion with the powers of the general government, are undoubtedly within those which are re-
served to the states.”); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 547 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(contending that “[i]t was settled early in our constitutional history that the mere fact that Con-
gress has power to regulate commerce among the several States does not exclude State legisla-
tion in the exercise of the police power, even though it may affect such commerce” and invok-
ing “regard for the harmonious balance of our federal system, whereby the States may protect
local interests despite the dormant Commerce Clause”)
158. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624. Note also that the limitations imposed by the
courts under the dormant Commerce Clause are not final or conclusive. Congress is free to ap-
prove state laws that would otherwise be found to violate the dormant Commerce Clause. See
In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 562-65 (1891) (“The framers of the Constitution never intended that
the legislative power of the nation should find itself incapable of disposing of a subject matter
specifically committed to its charge.”); see also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 255 (1986) (discussing the Rahrer opinion).
159. See Mary LaFrance, Constitutional Implications of Acquisition-Value Real Property
Taxation: Assessing the Burdens on Travel and Commerce, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1027, 1087
(1994) (discussing the difference between “the balancing of interests approach traditionally
applied in Commerce Clause analysis of state economic regulations” and the different ap-
proach used to analyze state taxation schemes).
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Present dormant Commerce Clause doctrine employs a two-
tiered analysis of state economic regulations.160 The first question is
whether the measure at issue discriminates against interstate com-
merce.161 “When a state statute directly regulates or discriminates
against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state
economic interests over out-of-state interests,” the measure is dis-
criminatory.162 Thus, facially nondiscriminatory measures that never-
theless favor in-state over out-of-state interests fall into the same
category as facially discriminatory measures. If a measure is deemed
discriminatory, a court will then ask whether the measure was en-
acted in pursuit of a legitimate public purpose and whether there are
no less discriminatory means by which to accomplish that purpose.163
Discriminatory measures are usually, though not always, invali-
dated.164
If a measure does not discriminate and its effects on interstate
commerce are only indirect or incidental, a court examines the state
interest being pursued and whether the local benefits are clearly ex-
ceeded by the burden the statute places on interstate commerce.165 If
the benefits are clearly exceeded by the burden on commerce, the
measure is invalidated.166 The approach to the second class of statutes,
known as Pike balancing, was first enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.167
Many object to dormant Commerce Clause doctrine not only be-
cause its textual and theoretical justifications are tenuous but also be-
cause its application is fraught with difficulties.168 The most obvious
160. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
578-79 (1986).
161. See id.
162. Id. at 579.
163. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
164. See infra note 170 and notes 190-202 and accompanying text.
165. See Brown-Forman Distillers, 476 U.S. at 579.
166. See id.
167. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will
be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.” (citing Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)).
168. See, e.g., Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and
Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 554 (1995):
We still do not have an adequate theory of the commerce power . . . . Not only is our
theory self-contradictory . . . , but the particular rules we have developed, and the
way we apply them, cannot stand up to reflection about why we have the federal
government and what it ought to be able to do.
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problem, and the one most crucial to the question posed in this Note,
is that it is difficult to determine whether a facially nondiscriminatory
measure favors in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests
or merely has an indirect, “incidental” effect upon interstate com-
merce. The Court has acknowledged this difficulty, noting that there
is no “clear line” separating the two categories of regulations and
that “[i]n either situation the critical consideration is the overall ef-
fect of the statute on both local and interstate activity.”169
The “overall effect” language gives very little guidance about
how the discrimination inquiry is to be conducted, yet the inquiry it-
self has great practical importance. Measures deemed to favor in-
state interests are almost always invalidated, while those subjected to
Pike balancing usually survive.170 The following discussion first ex-
amines how the Court decides whether a measure is discriminatory or
merely has an incidental effect on interstate commerce and then
turns to how a measure is evaluated once it has been placed in one of
these categories.
A. Discriminatory or Incidental Effect
Facially nondiscriminatory measures may discriminate against
interstate commerce “in practical effect.”171 Determining whether a
measure actually does so, however, is a difficult matter. As noted
above, the Supreme Court has said very little about how courts are to
make this determination. It does seem clear, though, that a court
                                                                                                                                     
That the application of the doctrine has been inconsistent has been recognized by members of
the Supreme Court itself. Justice Scalia, writing a separate opinion in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc.
v. Washington State Department of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987), wrote that the “applications
of the doctrine have, not to put too fine a point on the matter, made no sense.” Id. at 260
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
169. Brown-Forman Distillers, 476 U.S. at 579. The Court has also acknowledged that the
determination is critical to the outcome of a case: “The crucial inquiry, therefore, must be di-
rected to determining whether [the statute] is basically a protectionist measure, or whether it
can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate
commerce that are only incidental.” City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624
(1978) (emphasis added).
170. See Amy M. Petragnani, Comment, The Dormant Commerce Clause: On Its Last Leg,
57 ALB. L. REV. 1215, 1237 (1994) (noting that from 1986 through 1993, all seven state meas-
ures deemed discriminatory by the Supreme Court were invalidated, while three of the four
measures to which Pike balancing was applied survived).
171. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
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must look either to the stated reasons for which the measure was en-
acted or to where the burdens of a measure actually fall.172
If a measure was enacted with the intent to benefit in-state inter-
ests at the expense of out-of-state interests, the measure will be found
discriminatory and will almost assuredly be invalidated.173 In Middle
South Energy, Inc. v. Arkansas Public Service Commission,174 for ex-
ample, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with the attempts of
the Arkansas Public Service Commission (APSC) to interfere with
the Arkansas Power and Light Company’s contracts to purchase nu-
clear power produced in another state.175 The APSC argued that the
contract did not meet Arkansas’s regulatory requirements, but it had
previously made clear in arguments before the Securities and Ex-
change Commission that its real concern was to shift rate increases
away from Arkansas citizens to the citizens of other states.176 Given
this evidence of protectionist intent, the court found the commis-
sion’s actions discriminatory and in violation of the dormant Com-
merce Clause.177
Some scholars advocate limiting the discrimination determina-
tion exclusively to whether the measure at issue was enacted with
protectionist intent.178 This approach would eliminate the need for a
court to assess where the burdens created by a measure fall—a diffi-
172. The framework for the following discussion owes much to Daniel A. Farber and Rob-
ert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATT’s-Eye View of the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1416 (1994), which outlines a number of factors courts
might look to when making the discrimination determination.
173. This is exactly what dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence seeks to prevent. See
Baldwin v. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935) (“What is ultimate is the principle that one
state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position of economic isolation.”). If
evidence of protectionist intent is absent, a court’s inquiry into whether the measure at issue is
discriminatory in effect may fairly be thought of as a search for indirect evidence of protec-
tionist intent.
174. 772 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1985).
175. See id. at 406.
176. See id. at 416-17.
177. See id. The court cited a Supreme Court case, Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc.,
447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980), for the proposition that a “virtually per se rule of invalidity” applies to
protectionist measures. Middle South Energy, 772 F.2d at 416.
178. See, e.g., Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense
of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1092-93 (1986) (arguing that in the
“central area” of movement-of-goods cases, the Court “should be concerned only with pre-
venting purposeful protectionism”).
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cult judgment that courts may be ill-suited to make.179 Because it so
easily results in invalidation, however, evidence of protectionist in-
tent is usually difficult or impossible to find; the body enacting a
measure is careful to guard against showing any desire to impede in-
terstate commerce. Moreover, it is not obvious how much evidence is
sufficient to show discriminatory intent.180 When a measure is passed
by a state legislature, for example, the statements of a single legisla-
tor are probably not enough to taint the measure, but this may often
be the only evidence of protectionist intent. Because evidence of pro-
tectionist intent is usually absent or limited, a court is normally
forced to look for indirect indicators of protectionist intent by ana-
lyzing where the burdens of a measure fall.
In performing this inquiry, courts look to see whether the meas-
ure at issue employs a classification that is an effective proxy for dis-
tinguishing between local and foreign interests;181 whether the meas-
ure effectively places an embargo on out-of-state goods;182 or whether
179. See id. at 1147 (arguing in favor of motive review in dormant Commerce Clause cases
and contending that balancing does not reflect a “proper underlying prescription for legislative
behavior” because the legislature does not need to and cannot balance).
180. See id. (noting the “ascertainability” problem which questions whether a court can de-
termine what the legislature’s motive was).
181. See Farber & Hudec, supra note 172, at 1416 & n.56. Such a measure stands a good
chance of being deemed discriminatory by a court. In Atlantic Prince, Ltd. v. Jorling, 710 F.
Supp. 893 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), the district court condemned as discriminatory a New York statute
that prohibited fishing vessels of over 90 feet in length from fishing in New York waters. See id.
at 895-96. The measure was found discriminatory because, at the time of the bill’s passage,
there was only one fishing boat in New York that was over 90 feet in length, and there was evi-
dence that those who supported the measure were well aware of the fact that it would burden
foreign interests almost exclusively. See id. at 897. In contrast to Jorling, the court in Davrod
Corp. v. Coates, 971 F.2d 778 (1st Cir. 1992), found that a Massachusetts statute that limited the
length of fishing vessels to 90 feet did not discriminate against interstate commerce because
there were a number of boats over 90 feet based in Massachusetts. See id. at 788. Out-of-state
interests, the court said, were not burdened disproportionately. See id. at 789. The 90-foot limi-
tation in Coates was subjected to Pike balancing and was upheld; the same limitation, deemed
discriminatory in its particular context, was subjected to stricter scrutiny in Jorling and was
struck down.
182. See Farber & Hudec, supra note 172, at 1416 & n.57. In Government Suppliers Con-
solidating Services, Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1992), the Seventh Circuit considered a
complex set of Indiana regulations that would have had the practical effect, by drastically rais-
ing costs, of keeping trash from other states out of Indiana. See id. at 1279. The court deter-
mined that the regulations were discriminatory for purposes of dormant Commerce Clause
analysis because, in effect, they “erected an economic barrier against the importation of mu-
nicipal waste.” Id. In the course of its decision, the court cautioned that “[d]iscrimination may
take the form of ‘raising the costs of doing business’ for out-of state entities, ‘while leaving
those of their [in-state] counterparts unaffected.’” Id. (quoting Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 351 (1977)).
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the measure has the effect of giving in-state interests a competitive
advantage over out-of-state interests.183 Making any of these determi-
nations, however, requires a court to decide which interests to recog-
nize and what balance of interests is required for a statute to be
deemed discriminatory. Untangling all the various interests affected
by a measure is a difficult, if not impossible, task, and at present the
Supreme Court has not offered any guidance as to how it or other
courts are to conduct or limit their inquiry.
Because evaluating where the burdens of a measure fall may be
impossible to do completely and accurately, courts probably are
much more comfortable deeming a measure discriminatory when
there is at least some direct evidence of protectionist intent.184 But an
intent requirement, unstated or not, does not mesh with the enunci-
ated purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause, which is to ensure
that “our economic unit is the Nation” and that the states do not be-
183. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977), is an
example of a case where a facially nondiscriminatory statute that granted a competitive advan-
tage to in-state interests was deemed discriminatory and subjected to stricter scrutiny. See id. at
350. North Carolina had passed a statute that prohibited all containers of apples sold within the
state from bearing any grade “other than the applicable U.S. grade or standard.” N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 106-189.1 (1974 Supp.) (repealed 1983). The Washington State Apple Advertising
Commission contended that the measure unfairly discriminated against apples grown in Wash-
ington, which were subjected to a grading system more stringent than the national one and
which bore evidence of this fact on their packaging. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 336-38. The Court
found that the measure discriminated against Washington apples both by raising the growers’
costs of doing business in North Carolina (compliance with the new law would have been ex-
pensive) and by stripping the growers of the competitive advantage they had gained through
Washington’s expensive and stringent grading system. See id. at 350-51. The Court went on to
invalidate the statute. See id. at 354.
Note that it was not only the interests of North Carolina and Washington apple growers
that were affected by the statute at issue in Hunt. Other out-of-state growers whose apples were
sold in North Carolina, assuming their apples had not gained the same reputation for quality as
Washington apples, benefited from the statute in the same way that North Carolina growers
did. Note also that the statute deprived North Carolina apple consumers of the additional in-
formation on the Washington apple containers.
184. Indeed, some such evidence existed in most of the cases cited supra notes 181-83. In
the Hunt case, for example, the Washington State Apple Advertising Commission had applied
for an exemption to the North Carolina statute soon after it was passed. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at
339. In response, the North Carolina Agriculture Commissioner said that, before granting an
exemption, he would “want to have the sentiment from our apple producers since they were
mainly responsible for [the] legislation being passed.” Id. at 352. In the Jorling decision, the
Court quoted a New York state assemblyman who had supported the measure at issue: “At this
time, foreign fleets are preparing to introduce into New York State waters vessels in excess of
90 feet with freezer-processor capabilities. Such vessels will create an imbalance in the state’s
fishery and provide foreign fleets with an unfair advantage over the state’s commercial fishing
industry.” Jorling, 710 F. Supp. at 902. The court in Coates specifically noted the lack of similar
evidence in that case. See Coates, 971 F.2d at 789.
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come “separable economic units.”185 In addition, requiring intent is
not the way all courts have applied the doctrine.186 Justice Stewart ap-
pears to have been closer the mark when he stated in City of Phila-
delphia v. New Jersey187 that “the evil of protectionism can reside in
legislative means as well as legislative ends.”188
Despite the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance on how to conduct
it, the discrimination determination is, as has been noted already,
crucial to a measure’s ultimate fate.189 Because the lack of guidance
makes it difficult to predict how a particular case would be decided,
the analysis offered in this Note contains an unavoidable (but I be-
lieve small) element of uncertainty.
B. Measures Deemed Discriminatory
The Supreme Court has said repeatedly that discriminatory
measures are “virtually per se invalid” under the dormant Commerce
Clause.190 This language is actually too strong, though, for the Court
has also ruled that even when discrimination is shown, the measure in
question is permissible if the state or local government can show that
the measure serves a legitimate local purpose and that the purpose
could not be served as well without discriminating against interstate
commerce (hardly an insurmountable burden).191 For example, Maine
v. Taylor192 involved a statute which prohibited the importation into
Maine of any live baitfish.193 Clearly discriminatory, the statute was
subjected to the test outlined above.194 The Court found that the
Maine statute served the legitimate local purpose of protecting native
fisheries from parasites found in fish from other states and that this
purpose could not be served as well by nondiscriminatory means, be-
185. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1949).
186. In Bayh, for example, the court found no direct evidence of protectionist intent but
nevertheless deemed the statute discriminatory. See Bayh, 975 F.2d at 1279.
187. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
188. Id. at 626.
189. See supra note 170.
190. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579
(1986); see also City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 (“[W]here simple economic protectionism
is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected.”); Lewis v.
BT Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980) (quoting City of Philadelphia).
191. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
192. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
193. See id. at 137.
194. See id. at 138.
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cause adequate testing procedures did not exist.195 The statute was
upheld.196
The decision of the Supreme Court in a case decided long before
the development of present doctrine (but analogous to the situation
in Wal*Mart Stores) also illustrates that a discriminatory measure
may be upheld by the Court if the purpose it was enacted to achieve
is deemed important enough. In Breard v. Alexandria,197 the Court
held that an Alexandria, Louisiana ordinance that prohibited the
door-to-door sale of goods did not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause.198 Facially nondiscriminatory, the ordinance nevertheless
primarily handicapped national businesses, which, by virtue of the
fact that they were not based in Alexandria, were much more likely
than local businesses to conduct their sales door-to-door.199 Addition-
ally, the benefits of the ordinance primarily fell on those businesses’
local competitors, most of which did not conduct their sales door-to-
door.200 The Court upheld the ordinance, concluding that the meas-
ure, regardless of its effect on interstate commerce, was a legitimate
exercise of the police power and that “[w]hen there is a reasonable
basis for legislation to protect the social . . . welfare of a community,
it is not for this Court because of the Commerce Clause to deny the
exercise locally of the sovereign power of Louisiana.”201
The placement of a measure into either the “discriminatory” or
“incidental effect” category does not, then, necessarily determine the
outcome in a particular case. The burden is certainly heavier on the
state when a measure is placed in the “discriminatory” category,
however, and it can safely be said that Maine v. Taylor is the excep-
tion rather than the rule.202
C. Pike Balancing
If a measure is deemed to have only an incidental effect on inter-
state commerce, the test used to determine if it nevertheless violates
195. See id. at 147, 148.
196. See id. at 151-52.
197. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
198. See id. at 641.
199. See Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 125,
138.
200. See id.
201. Breard, 341 U.S. at 640.
202. See text accompanying notes 169-72.
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the dormant Commerce Clause is that first enunciated in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc.203 The Supreme Court, which refers to the Pike
test as a balancing approach, has explained the test in the following
manner: “When . . . a statute has only indirect effects on interstate
commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we have examined whether
the State’s interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate
commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits.”204
Pike balancing is applied once a state measure has been declared
evenhanded rather than discriminatory.205 The Court usually approves
measures to which it applies the Pike balancing test.206 In Northwest
Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corporation Commission,207 the Court
upheld a Kansas regulation that permanently canceled producers’ en-
titlements to extract assigned amounts of gas if those producers de-
layed production for too long.208 The regulation was challenged by an
interstate pipeline corporation that contended that the effect of the
statute was either to give Kansas producers a larger share of the mar-
ket than they would otherwise enjoy or to divert gas from the inter-
state to the intrastate market.209 Applying Pike, the Court ruled that
even if the regulation, which was applied evenhandedly, did have
these effects, it still did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause
because the effects were “not ‘clearly excessive’ in relation to Kansas’
substantial interest in controlling production to prevent waste and
protect correlative rights.”210
203. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
204. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579
(1986).
205. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
206. See Farber & Hudec, supra note 172, at 1415. This is not always the case. Indeed, the
statute at issue in Pike itself was invalidated under the new approach. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 146.
Pike involved an Arizona law requiring that all cantaloupes grown in that state be packed in
containers approved by a supervisor in charge of enforcing the Arizona Fruit and Vegetable
Standardization Act. See id. at 138. Pike, the supervisor, had prevented Bruce Church, Inc.
from shipping the uncrated cantaloupes it grew in Arizona to California for packaging. See id.
In order to comply with Pike’s order, Bruce Church would have been forced to build a pack-
aging facility of its own in Arizona, an endeavor that would have cost about $200,000. See id. at
140. The state’s interest, deemed legitimate, was identified as having Bruce Church’s canta-
loupes, which were of admittedly high quality, labeled as coming from Arizona. See id. at 145.
The Court, however, found this interest “tenuous” and declared that statutes which required
“business operations to be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be per-
formed elsewhere” were particularly likely to violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Id.
207. 489 U.S. 493 (1989).
208. See id. at 497, 526.
209. See id. at 497.
210. Id. at 526.
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The Supreme Court often upholds a measure even when the jus-
tification offered by the state is much weaker than that in Northwest
Pipeline.211 The reluctance of the Court to use Pike balancing to in-
validate a measure is due in part, no doubt, to the recognition that it
requires the Court to “second-guess the empirical judgments of law-
makers concerning the utility of legislation.”212 Scholars and judges
also recognize this, and many have argued that Pike should be limited
further or even eliminated from the jurisprudence of the dormant
Commerce Clause.213 The Court has not yet seen fit to do either, and
Pike’s continued authority holds open the possibility, though a re-
mote one, that an evenhanded state economic regulation could be in-
validated under the dormant Commerce Clause.
At this point, it is not difficult to see why dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine has been called a “conceptual muddle.”214 The doc-
trine itself, however, seems to be a smaller part of the problem than
the lack of guidance about how the doctrine is to be applied. The
following discussion will nevertheless attempt to predict how a re-
viewing court would apply the doctrine to the consideration of mar-
ket competition under Act 250’s fiscal criteria.
IV. A DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGE TO VERMONT’S
CONSIDERATION OF MARKET COMPETITION
Despite the difficulty of predicting the outcome of dormant
Commerce Clause cases generally, it can fairly safely be concluded
that a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to the consideration of
market competition under Act 250’s fiscal criteria would not succeed.
Part IV of this Note, the organization of which parallels that of Part
211. See Farber & Hudec, supra note 172, at 1415 (stating that the balancing test only re-
quires the state to present some evidence of regulatory benefit). In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981), for example, the Court upheld a law that banned the sale of
milk in nonreturnable plastic containers but allowed the use of other nonreturnable containers.
See id. at 474. The Minnesota Supreme Court had found no rational justification for the distinc-
tion. See Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. State, 289 N.W.2d 79, 87 (Minn. 1979).
212. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 679 (1981) (Brennan, J., con-
curring).
213. See, e.g., National Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1131-32
(7th Cir. 1995) (suggesting that Pike balancing should be applied only to laws that impact inter-
state commerce more heavily than local commerce); Regan, supra note 178, at 1143, 1208-09
(advocating only motive review under the dormant Commerce Clause and concluding that the
Supreme Court, despite what its doctrine says, rarely balances in any dormant Commerce
Clause case).
214. Tushnet, supra note 199, at 125.
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III, attempts to demonstrate why. Section IV.A examines whether a
court would deem the fiscal criteria, as interpreted by the Vermont
Supreme Court, to discriminate against interstate commerce. Section
IV.B discusses the probable outcome of a challenge to the interpreta-
tion, assuming that a court would find the interpretation discrimina-
tory. Section IV.C discusses the probable outcome if the interpreta-
tion were subjected to Pike balancing.
A. Discriminatory or Incidental Effect
Act 250’s fiscal criteria, and the expansive interpretation of them
approved by the Vermont Supreme Court, are not facially discrimi-
natory. However, Wal-Mart, if it made a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge, would argue that the consideration of market competition
is discriminatory in practical effect. As the following discussion
should make clear, such an argument has little chance of success.
First, Wal-Mart is highly unlikely to be able to offer direct evi-
dence that the consideration of market competition under Act 250’s
fiscal criteria is based on an intent to protect in-state interests at the
expense of out-of-state interests. The Vermont Supreme Court was
careful, as the Environmental Board had been at an earlier stage of
the dispute, to emphasize that the consideration of market competi-
tion was relevant only because of the effect that competition can have
on property values, and, hence, local tax bases.215
The difficulty, if not the impossibility, of the task that Wal-Mart
would face here is due to the fact that it would really be challenging
not Act 250 itself but the interpretation of that Act by the Environ-
mental Board and the Vermont Supreme Court, neither of which is
likely to offer offhand, unwise indications of its discriminatory intent
(assuming for the moment that such intent exists). Direct evidence of
discriminatory intent seems much more likely to be found when a
legislative enactment is being challenged and the record of the proc-
ess leading to enactment can be examined. Even then, however, the
pickings are likely to be slim, and it is unclear how much direct evi-
dence of discriminatory intent would be required before a measure
would be invalidated on that basis alone.216 In order to put forward a
215. See In re Wal*Mart Stores, Inc., 702 A.2d 397, 401 (Vt. 1997); supra note 134 and ac-
companying text.
216. In Maine v. Taylor the Court noted the following statement in a paper produced by the
Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife opposing the repeal of the ban on baitfish
importation: “[W]e can’t help asking why we should spend our money in Arkansas when it is
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successful dormant Commerce Clause challenge to the interpretation,
Wal-Mart would have to demonstrate intent indirectly, by showing
that the interpretation has a discriminatory impact on out-of-state in-
terests. This would require Wal-Mart, and the reviewing court, to
dive into the murky waters of assessing burdens.
It is likely, as well as advisable, that a court reviewing the expan-
sive interpretation of the fiscal criteria would limit its assessment of
where the burdens fall to the interpretation’s effect on in-state and
out-of-state retailers. As with any measure, there are myriad other
interests affected by the interpretation. Consumers are the most ob-
vious. Large-scale retailers can provide goods at lower prices than
smaller retailers, and Vermont consumers will be denied this benefit
if Act 250 is implemented to exclude Wal-Mart and others. Owners
of property in the developed portions of Vermont towns are also af-
fected; they are likely to see an increase in the value of their property
as the retailers located in those developed portions are protected
from competition by Act 250.
But the fact that a measure impacts a wide range of interests
does not mean that all those interests should, or can, be taken into
account when making the discrimination determination. Indeed, do-
ing so would render the determination meaningless by making it im-
possible to find a measure discriminatory. This is so because even a
measure enacted to benefit in-state interests will also almost always
burden other in-state interests (as well as benefit some out-of-state
interests).217 Because some limit must be placed on the inquiry, and in
the absence of any guidance from the courts on how to do so, the
following discussion will assume that a court would look only at the
effect the consideration of market competition would have on in-
state and out-of-state retailers.
Wal-Mart would basically argue that the consideration of market
competition, in combination with the ten-acre “trigger” for Act 250,
operates effectively to prevent large retailers from building stores in
Vermont. Assume for the purposes of argument that there are no re-
tailers within the state who would require a development of over ten
                                                                                                                                     
far better spent at home? . . . There is also the possibility that such an industry could develop a
lucrative export market in neighboring states.” Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 149 (1986)
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 752 F.2d 757, 760 (1st Cir. 1985)). The
Court agreed with the magistrate judge that these statements did not convert “the Maine stat-
ute into an economic protectionism measure.” Id. at 149-50.
217. As explained above, Vermont consumers who would be denied the right to purchase
goods at lower prices are burdened if large-scale retailers are kept out of Vermont.
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acres on which to build a store. Wal-Mart could then argue that,
within the retail market, the criteria and the interpretation of those
criteria approved by the Vermont Supreme Court burden out-of-
state interests exclusively. Moreover, the limitation on market com-
petition benefits all those with an existing interest in commercial de-
velopments in Vermont by ensuring that those developments will not
have to compete with newer, larger developments if such competition
would mean a decline in the fortunes of existing developments (and a
consequent decline in the tax base). In short, Wal-Mart would argue
that the Vermont measure, whatever its avowed purpose, too con-
veniently favors in-state, existing businesses over out-of-state busi-
nesses.
Wal-Mart might attempt to characterize the Act 250 criteria as
an effective “embargo” on large-scale retail stores, which are virtu-
ally all out-of-state entities, given the lack of any large-scale retailers
in Vermont. The court in Government Suppliers Consolidating Serv-
ices, Inc. v. Bayh218 ruled that Indiana could not use measures to ef-
fectively place an embargo on out-of-state trash.219 A crucial element
of the Indiana measures is missing from the Vermont criteria, how-
ever. The Indiana measures worked against out-of-state trash and
treated Indiana trash preferentially.220 The Vermont interpretation
works against out-of-state interests who wish to build large commer-
cial developments but does not differentiate between out-of-state and
in-state interests. It merely happens to be the case that the in-state
“trash” does not exist. The Vermont criteria, then, work not as an
embargo but as a complete prohibition of a certain type of good.
Wal-Mart’s situation is not analogous to that of the plaintiff in Gov-
ernment Suppliers.
It would also be difficult for Wal-Mart to characterize the con-
sideration of market competition under the fiscal criteria as a proxy
characteristic meant to exclude all out-of-state interests. The only
possible characteristic on which such a claim could be based is the
ten-acre minimum for developments requiring a permit. This re-
quirement, then, would be analogous to the limitation on ninety-foot
boats in Atlantic Prince, Ltd. v. Jorling,221 where the court found the
limit discriminatory because there was only one in-state boat that ex-
218. 975 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1992).
219. See id. at 1279.
220. See id.
221. 710 F. Supp. 893 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
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ceeded the limitation.222 The ten-acre requirement, though, applies
not only to commercial developments but to industrial and certain
residential developments as well. It is therefore somewhat wanting as
a proxy characteristic, because it is, to say the least, doubtful that no
one in Vermont will ever be interested in building a ten-acre com-
mercial, industrial, or residential development.223
A court may be more likely to find a measure discriminatory if it
grants in-state businesses a competitive advantage over out-of-state
businesses. Thus, Wal-Mart might be able to liken its position to that
of the Washington apple industry in Hunt. In that case in-state apple
producers were in competition with Washington apple producers.224
None of the in-state producers used a grading system as stringent as
that used in Washington, however, and so none of them were bur-
dened by the requirement that apples not be labeled with any grade
other than the U.S. standard.225 Similarly, in Vermont, there are in-
state commercial businesses who are potential competitors, at least,
with out-of-state interests who wish to build developments of over
ten acres.226 If Wal-Mart could show that no in-state retailers are
likely to require more than ten acres on which to build a store, then it
may be able to draw a successful analogy to Hunt. In both cases, the
fact that out-of-state interests are burdened benefits in-state interests
(as well as out-of-state interests who do not fall under either meas-
ure’s ambit).227
222. See id. at 896-97.
223. One might argue here that the fiscal criteria cannot be discriminatory because they do
not burden all out-of-state retailers who might wish to locate in Vermont. Out-of-state interests
who wish to build developments of less than ten acres are not burdened at all by the criteria, for
they do not have to obtain a permit in order to build. But the fact that a measure does not bur-
den all out-of-state interests in a regulated market does not mean that the measure does not
discriminate. The statute invalidated in Jorling is a good example; while all ninety-foot vessels
(except one) fishing in New York waters were out-of-state vessels, it was assuredly not the case
that all out-of-state vessels fishing in New York waters were ninety feet long or longer. The
statute undoubtedly benefited out-of-state vessels of less than ninety feet just as much as it did
in-state vessels. In the Hunt case, there were almost assuredly other states where apples that
were eventually sold in North Carolina were grown, and which did not compete well with the
Washington apples. Apple growers in these states would have benefited from the North Caro-
lina statute just as much as North Carolina apple growers. Yet the statutes in both Jorling and
Hunt were deemed discriminatory and then invalidated. See Jorling, 710 F. Supp. at 895-96,
903; Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 354 (1977).
224. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 337.
225. See id. at 351.
226. See KELLY, supra note 26, at 108-09.
227. The distinction between the “proxy characteristic” and “competitive advantage” ar-
guments is not immediately apparent. Both arguments depend on the assumptions, first, that
SHOEMAKE TO PRINTER 04/15/99 4:23 PM
1999] THE SMALLING OF AMERICA 925
Wal-Mart’s best argument, then, appears to be not that Vermont
is using an embargo or proxy characteristic to exclude out-of-state re-
tailers, but that it is stripping those retailers of their competitive ad-
vantage by forcing them to do business in a different way. This argu-
ment, however, is highly unlikely to succeed. First, the Court is less
likely to find discriminatory a measure that, like Act 250, effectively
regulates a way of doing business rather than one which regulates the
flow of goods. In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,228 the Court
heard a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a Maryland statute
that prohibited producers or refiners of petroleum products from op-
erating service stations within the state of Maryland.229 There were no
producer-refiners in Maryland who could have been adversely af-
fected by the statute; all were outside the state.230 The Court con-
cluded that the statute was not discriminatory because it did not treat
in-state and out-of-state companies differently.231 The fact that the
burden of the statute happened to fall exclusively on out-of-state in-
terests did not lead, “either logically or as a practical matter, to a
conclusion that the State is discriminating against interstate com-
merce at the retail level.”232 Emphasizing that the statute placed no
burden on out-of-state independent dealers (as distinguished from
out-of-state producer-refiners), the Court declared that the dormant
Commerce Clause was not meant to protect “the particular structure
or methods of operation in a retail market.”233 The Maryland statute,
it said, did not “prohibit the flow of interstate goods, place added
                                                                                                                                     
only out-of-state interests are burdened by a measure, and, second, that in-state interests bene-
fit as a result. The difference between the two is more one of nuance than of substance. The
proxy characteristic argument more strongly suggests discriminatory intent and could probably
only succeed where a characteristic appears to have been chosen to discriminate against out-of-
state interests. The ten-acre requirement of the Vermont measure applies too broadly to be
called a proxy for discriminating against large, out-of-state retailers. See supra note 223 and
accompanying text. The competitive advantage argument, on the other hand, appears to place
more emphasis on the effect of the measure and does not require the same degree of precision.
Any argument that depends even slightly on legislative intent will increase the risk that the re-
viewing court will look at the stated purpose of the measure (or action) at this stage of the in-
quiry. Because the stated reason for the denial of the permit is undoubtedly legitimate, see infra
notes 240-45 and accompanying text, Wal-Mart should avoid any argument that depends, even
implicitly, on intent and focus instead on the effect of the action taken here. Because of its em-
phasis on effect, the competitive advantage argument is the stronger argument for Wal-Mart.
228. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
229. See id. at 119-20.
230. See id. at 125.
231. See id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 127.
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costs upon them, or distinguish between in-state and out-of-state
companies in the retail market.”234
Exxon is difficult to reconcile with Hunt. The North Carolina
statute at issue in the latter case similarly did not prohibit the flow of
interstate goods or distinguish between in-state and out-of-state
goods in the retail market. It, like the measure at issue in Exxon, was
a regulation of how business was done. Yet the Court found the
North Carolina statute discriminatory. Why? The major distinction
between the two cases seems to be that in Hunt, the Court found the
statute ineffective at serving its avowed public purpose.235 The two
cases thus suggest that the Court, when it makes its discrimination
determination, may consider more than just the discriminatory intent
or effect of a measure (even though, according to the doctrine, how
well a measure serves its purpose is not to be taken into account until
after the discrimination determination has been made).
The implication for Wal-Mart’s argument is not encouraging, be-
cause the reviewing court would surely conclude that Act 250’s fiscal
criteria, and the consideration of market competition under them, do
serve a legitimate local purpose.236 The reviewing court, then, would
be likely to rule that the broad interpretation of the criteria does not
discriminate against interstate commerce. This does not bode well for
Wal-Mart’s case. In deciding that the Maryland statute at issue in
Exxon did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause, the Supreme
Court declared: “It may be true that the consuming public will be in-
jured by the loss of the high-volume, low-priced stations operated by
the independent refiners, but again that argument relates to the wis-
dom of the statute, not to its burden on commerce.”237
B. If Deemed Discriminatory
If the Vermont criteria and their interpretation were, despite the
foregoing discussion, deemed discriminatory, then the reviewing
court, according to the doctrine, would evaluate whether the criteria
serve a legitimate local purpose and whether the purpose could be
served as well through less discriminatory means.238 The stated pur-
pose of Act 250 is to ensure that the lands of Vermont are not used in
234. Id. at 126.
235. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353-54 (1977).
236. See infra notes 238-46 and accompanying text.
237. Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 128.
238. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
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a manner detrimental to the public welfare.239 The narrower justifica-
tion offered by the Environmental Board for the consideration of
market competition is the protection of the property tax bases of
Vermont towns, and the criteria and their interpretation should be
examined for how well they serve this purpose.240
Protecting the tax base has been recognized as an exercise of the
police power rationally related to promoting the public welfare.241
The validity of this purpose has also been recognized in the land-use
context.242 In Texas Manufactured Housing Association v. City of
Nederland,243 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote: “Maintenance
of property values has long been recognized as a legitimate objective
of local land-use regulation.”244 The court then cited to a Texas Su-
preme Court case, City of Brookside Village v. Comeau,245 which up-
held a local ordinance restricting the placement of mobile homes to
certain areas because the ordinance worked to preserve property val-
ues.246
Wal-Mart would argue that the preservation of property values
and the protection of local governments against “financial loss”
should not be accomplished by inflicting a direct financial loss on an-
other party. But the fact that the government is inflicting a financial
loss on Wal-Mart (or, more accurately, denying a financial gain) does
not affect the legitimacy of Vermont’s purpose and, therefore, should
not affect the Court’s evaluation of the Vermont criteria under the
dormant Commerce Clause, if it deems those criteria discriminatory.
The purpose for the consideration of market competition under the
239. See Act of Apr. 4, 1970, No. 250, § 1, 1970 Vt. Acts & Resolves 237.
240. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
241. See Colorado Manufactured Hous. Ass’n v. City of Salida, 977 F. Supp. 1080, 1089 (D.
Colo. 1997). The case cited by the Vermont Supreme Court in Wal*Mart Stores is not the
strongest support for this proposition when applied to the land-use context; People v. Kohrig,
498 N.E.2d 1158 (Ill. 1986), concerned the legitimacy of the Illinois seat belt law, one justifica-
tion for which was that it would reduce the public costs associated with traffic accidents. See id.
at 1166.
242. See, e.g., CMH Mfg., Inc. v. Catawba County, 994 F. Supp. 697, 711 (W.D.N.C. 1998)
(“Addressing citizen concerns over . . . falling property values (actual or perceived) is clearly a
legitimate government interest.”); Colorado Manufactured, 977 F. Supp. at 1085 (“Local gov-
ernments are empowered to respond appropriately to perceived needs relating to government
functions, e.g. stability within the community and property values.”).
243. 101 F.3d 1095 (5th Cir. 1996).
244. Id. at 1104 n.10.
245. 633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1982).
246. See id. at 794. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Comeau case. See Comeau
v. City of Brookside Village, 459 U.S. 1087 (1982).
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Act 250 criteria, as put forward by the Environmental Board and as
approved by the Vermont Supreme Court, is legitimate.
Wal-Mart would then have to argue that this purpose could be
accomplished through less discriminatory means. The only poten-
tially discriminatory element of the statute is the fact that only devel-
opments larger than ten acres require approval under Act 250. Wal-
Mart could very sensibly contend that “strip” development, or a se-
ries of smaller developments lining a road, increase traffic congestion
and pollution and destroy just as much of the landscape as larger de-
velopments, yet strip development is allowed to continue unimpeded
under Act 250, while larger developments (and large retailers) can be
effectively excluded. But one of the purposes of the law, as discussed
above, is the protection of property values (and consequently the tax
base), and large developments are much more likely than small de-
velopments to drain customers and business from other areas.
Moreover, it is sensible for there to be some minimum below which
permission under Act 250 would not be required; the state should be
allowed to accomplish its goals without placing too onerous an ad-
ministrative burden on itself or other parties. Finally, even if Wal-
Mart wins this argument, it loses, because the only way to make Act
250 and its interpretation here less discriminatory but still accomplish
the goals of the statute is to lower the permission threshold, not to
exempt large retailers from the permission requirement.
There may be other situations in which a growth-management
statute unnecessarily excludes out-of-state interests and benefits in-
state interests in the same market. But Act 250’s fiscal criteria, and
the expansive interpretation of them, do not do so and would survive
dormant Commerce Clause review even if they were deemed dis-
criminatory.
C. Pike Balancing
If a court concludes that a measure does not discriminate against
interstate commerce, it then moves on, under Pike v. Bruce Church,
to determine whether the purpose of the measure at issue is legiti-
mate and “whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly ex-
ceeds the local benefits.”247 As discussed above, the purpose of Act
250’s fiscal criteria would undoubtedly be deemed legitimate. Pike
247. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579
(1986).
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balancing is a more nuanced, more expansive inquiry than the test for
discriminatory measures and explicitly allows a court to consider the
nature of the public interest being served by a measure.248 Under the
test for discriminatory measures, courts are to consider the more
limited questions of whether the measure serves a legitimate public
purpose and whether that purpose could be served as well using
other, less discriminatory means.249
The expanded inquiry contemplated under Pike balancing does
not mean, however, that the scrutiny under Pike is stricter than that
applied when a measure is deemed discriminatory. The “clearly ex-
cessive” requirement precludes this possibility, as does the fact that
discriminatory measures, by virtue of the fact that they are discrimi-
natory, are regarded with greater suspicion.
Wal-Mart, in order to satisfy the “clearly excessive” standard,
must contend that the purpose being served by the fiscal criteria—the
protection of the financial condition of local governments—does not
justify the burden to interstate commerce imposed by such a direct
limit on market competition. Courts are likely to be wary when it ap-
pears that competition is being suppressed. In H.P. Hood & Sons,
Inc. v. Du Mond,250 a case decided before the development of the two-
tiered approach to dormant Commerce Clause questions, the Su-
preme Court addressed New York’s denial of H.P. Hood & Sons’ ap-
plication for a license to expand its milk distribution facilities in the
state.251 New York contended both that farmers in the area were al-
ready adequately served by existing facilities and that unregulated
competition would reduce the milk received at existing plants.252 The
Court, while recognizing that regulation of the dairy industry was
connected to the public health and welfare, struck down the denial,
stating: “[T]he state may not use its admitted powers to protect the
health and safety of its people as a basis for suppressing competi-
248. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The Court stated:
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And
the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of
the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.
Id. (emphasis added).
249. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
250. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
251. See id. at 526.
252. See id. at 528-29.
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tion.”253 Wal-Mart would argue that limiting the market is especially
unsavory when it is not the public health or safety at stake but the
public pocketbook.
Yet it seems clear here that competition is being suppressed, if at
all, not to benefit private local interests (as appeared to be the case in
Hood) but to further the stated and legitimate purpose of the fiscal
criteria. Additionally, unlike the measure at issue in Hood, the fiscal
criteria do not impede or limit the flow of goods, but merely regulate
the way in which business is conducted.254 The fact that they have the
effect of limiting competition does not, then, by itself make the bur-
den to interstate commerce excessive.
Wal-Mart would thus be forced to argue that the burden to itself
(and to other large retailers who might potentially do business in
Vermont) is excessively large when compared with the amount of
money local governments might lose if the new store were con-
structed. But a burden to Wal-Mart is not the same thing as a burden
to interstate commerce, and preventing an entity from doing business
in a certain way is not the same thing as preventing it from doing
business at all. It seems highly unlikely that a court, when the balance
is struck, would find that any burden to interstate commerce from the
indirect limitations imposed by Act 250’s fiscal criteria and their in-
terpretation clearly exceeds the numerous (and not purely financial)
local benefits flowing from a careful application of those criteria.
It is in fact difficult to imagine a situation in which a growth-
management statute, without being discriminatory, would be so inef-
fective at accomplishing its purpose, and so burdensome to interstate
commerce, that it would be invalidated by a court under the balanc-
ing test of Pike. Any dormant Commerce Clause review of a growth-
management statute would have to take into account not only a
state’s interest in protecting the property tax bases of its local gov-
ernments but also its very legitimate, and very weighty, interest in en-
suring that its lands are used in a manner that is beneficial, in tangible
and intangible ways, to the people of the state.
CONCLUSION
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is, perhaps unavoidably,
very confused. Despite this fact, however, it is safe to say that a dor-
253. Id. at 538.
254. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
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mant Commerce Clause challenge to the fiscal criterion of Vermont’s
Act 250 and to the consideration under them of market competition
would, and should, fail.255 Growth control and growth-management
measures are attempts to address the myriad problems associated
with development in late-twentieth-century America. Such problems
are not limited to the demise of small towns but also include, traffic
congestion, pollution, the decline of city centers, strains on infrastruc-
ture, and a declining sense of community. These problems are cer-
tainly not exclusively the result of unrestrained commercial growth
but have a lot to do as well with the American view of property
rights, the pervasive use of zoning, the tax system and the incentives
it creates, and a host of other factors. State and local governments are
unable to address all of these causes, but they are able to address, in
some fashion, their effects. Growth control measures are one attempt
to do so, and while they must not violate the Constitution, it would be
unfortunate if that Constitution, including the dormant Commerce
Clause, were interpreted to excessively limit the already limited pow-
ers of state and local governments to address the problems those
governments will increasingly be forced to confront.
255. As for Wal-Mart, it has very little to worry about. Along with other developers, it is
protected by its ability to garner local support (because, as noted, the benefits of development
are often concentrated while the costs are scattered) and influence over the local political proc-
ess that leads to the enactment of most growth control measures in the first place (at present,
only nine states have growth management statutes, see supra note 21). St. Albans itself sup-
ported the construction of a Wal-Mart, and there is little doubt that the giant retailer will con-
tinue to have a steady supply of towns all too willing to welcome it into their “neighborhoods.”
